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People confront problems and choose means to
address those problems as part of their everyday lives.
Often, the way in which these problems are resolved
reflects the power of the parties involved in the dispute
("disputants"). Research on dispute resolution has
demonstrated that unequal distribution of power is, in
fact, a key factor in detennining how disputes are
resolved. Power imbalances can range from structural
inequities between employer and employees (Edelman,
Erlanger, and Lande 1993), to societal effects of gender
interactions (Grillo 1991), to unequal levels of access
to information and strategic positioning (Galanter
1974). While dispute resolution has been studied in
numerous situations, few studies have investigated how
disputes are resolved within organizations that attempt
to minimize power imbalances by flattening their
structures and evenly distributing their ownership. I
accomplished this by comparing dispute resolution
strategies at conventional organizations and sharedpower organizations (i.e., worker cooperatives).
Worker cooperatives are businesses that are managed
and owned by their workers, and they exist to provide
employment to their member-employees. Because they
offer instructive insights into the relationship between
power and dispute resolution, worker cooperatives are
the primary focus of my research.
Extant research suggests that organizational
structure, ownership, and ideology greatly affect how
employees address their problems at work (i.e., their
grievance behavior). Because this project draws on
various bodies of literature, it addresses several
predictions on dispute resolution in worker
cooperatives. Sociology of Gender literature
emphasizes that successful dispute resolution is not
guaranteed, especially for women and other lesspowerful groups, and that organizational innovations
that benefit some workers, such as an emphasis on the
organization as a whole over a focus on individuals,
might disproportionately hann women (e.g., GwartneyGibbs and Lach 1994). The Organizations literature
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cautions that worker cooperatives might not be a viable
alternative to the conventional, hierarchical business.
Moreover, these worker cooperatives may be less
efficient and less likely to succeed as organizations. If
these businesses do struggle into existence and succeed,
however, their workers might enjoy such benefits as
greater respect and recognition and less labormanagement conflict (e.g., Hochner, Granrose, Goode,
Simon, and Appelbaum 1988). The Dispute Resolution
literature asserts that greater trust and shared goals
facilitate easier and more successful dispute resolution;
one might imagine that increased trust and shared goals
will be more common in worker cooperatives, where
inclusion, equality, and worker participation are
officially encouraged (e.g., Tjosvold, Morishima, and
Belsheim 1999). The literature on worker cooperatives
suggests that evenly distributed fonnal power and
greater worker participation should produce workersincluding women and other dis empowered groupswho are able to assert their needs and raise necessary
grievances, but cautions that the continued presence of
infonnal power might prevent some grievances from
being voiced at all.
Thus, cooperative businesses present a stark contrast
to conventionally organized businesses in that the
cooperatives attempt to evenly distribute power,
encourage worker control through egalitarian
ideologies and flattened management structure, and
engage in concerted efforts to minimize power
imbalances. 1 Unlike the producer cooperatives that are
scattered across the fannlands of the Midwest, in
worker cooperatives, "all the facilities, materials,
supplies, equipment, etc., are equally owned
collectively by the members. The goods and services
are seen as being provided by the co-op, not by
individual members" (Honigsberg, Kamoroff, and
Beatty 1982, p. 32).
I focused on worker cooperatives, rather than
producer, housing, or consumer cooperatives,2 because
this type of cooperative business offers the most
interesting glimpse into the relationship between
dispute resolution and power dynamics. Grievance
resolution and the power around it are most complex at
worker cooperatives because workplaces generally
have greater power inequalities than agricultural,
housing, and consumer organizations. More so than
where one lives or where one shops, workplaces
operate within a hierarchy of power. Additionally,
workplaces, as the most complicated type of
organization in which to experiment with evenly
dispersed power, are an abundant source of sociolegal
issues. Workplaces involve issues of rights,
interdependencies, and internal and external pressures
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which provide opportunities for particularly rich
research on workplace dispute resolution.
Furthermore, the organizational power imbalances
readily accepted at workplaces are not as entrenched
and pervasive in other institutions, which, instead, often
actively work to mitigate power imbalances. For
example, non-cooperative (conventional) stores try to
be responsive to customer needs and solicit consumer
input. Similarly, non-cooperative housing might try to
give residents a voice in the management of their
building. Such involvement of consumers and
residents is not considered radical or even unusual;
indeed, such efforts for inclusion are considered good
business practices and are incorporated by very
mainstream, conventional businesses.
Workplaces operate under the belief that the best
organization is hierarchical and with great deference to
power differences, however, even to the point of
emphasizing power inequalities. Through differences
in titles, responsibilities, privileges, and pay,
employees are allocated different statuses with varying
amounts of power. Some argue that hierarchical
differences in status are at the core of many businesses'
organization. Thus, the differences between consumer
cooperatives and conventional stores, and housing
cooperatives and other group living situations, are
minimal compared to the potentially vast differences
between worker cooperatives and conventional
businesses.
A few researchers have begun to explore grievance
resolution in worker cooperative businesses (e.g.,
Henry 1983; Tucker 1999). While some of these
researchers assume that such organizations exhibit
unique grievance behavior, one cannot infer that
flattened hierarchies and professed egalitarian
ideologies eliminate the impact of power on disputing,
mainly due to the distribution of power within them.
As Kleinman argues, power in these cooperatives
includes official components as well as unofficial
power (1996). Therefore, research in this area must
examine grievances with dual foci on official as well as
unofficial power. Official power refers to power
derived from explicitly stated rights or entitlements,
such as the right to formal grievance procedures or
democratic participation as outlined in an
organization's charter or an employment contract.
Unofficial power is power derived from more informal
sources, such as sex, race, or tenure in an organization,
and is often not explicitly acknowledged. The official
power distribution in a cooperative organization may
be more equalized, but the unofficial power mayor
may not be equally dispersed. Unofficial power might
not only contravene the official rules and ideology, but
may, in fact, contradict the explicit goals of the
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organization. Some researchers (e.g., Kanter 1982)
assert that unofficial power might be more critical in
cooperative contexts than in conventional workplaces.
RESEARCH METHODS
Using a qualitative comparative case method, I
investigated the relationship between formal and
informal grievance processing and official and
unofficial power. I defined formal grievances as any
disputes resolved through explicit procedures,
specifically designated by the organization for the
resolution of disputes. These grievances can be
between workers, between workers and management,
or between workers and the organization itself.
Informal grievances are similar types of disputes, but
are resolved through negotiation or informal mediation
without invoking any formalized dispute resolution
procedures. I compared interviews with 177 workers
from eight worksites in four industries-coal mining,
taxicab driving, wholefoods distribution, and
homecare. In each industry, I studied a matched set of
one worker cooperative and one conventional business.
These matched organizations are similar in size,
industry gender proportions, gender and race
proportions within the businesses, and gender of
managers. Within each matched set, I compared and
contrasted the grievance behavior of the worker
cooperative and that of the conventionally managed,
hierarchical business.
Additionally, this dissertation focused on two types
of power: official power and unofficial power. Official
power is explicit and is formally part of the
organization's rules. It is derived from explicitly stated
rights or entitlements and is often formally wlitten
down. Official power is a characteristic of an
organization or an industry; therefore, for a given
categOlY of workers within a business---Dr all workers
in smaller businesses such as those studied in this
project--official power will be unifOlm. In some
businesses, this official power was unifoffilly low; at
others it was unifonnly high. Interviewees' official
power was consistently equal with the co-workers'
within their organization because I focused on ranlcand-file workers' grievance strategies, as opposed to
including owners' responses. I examined official
power by comparing the explicitly stated rights and
entitlements within the worker cooperatives and
conventionally organized businesses, inquiring to
ensure that the explicitly stated official power was, in
fact, realized. For example, any members could be
elected to worker-management positions, so I asked if
there were any bars to being elected, such as certain
jobs' hours being viewed as incompatible with
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management meetings. I did not find any
inconsistencies with regard to official power.
I identified unofficial power through interviewees'
reports of power derived from informal sources. I
defined unofficial power as power that does not come
from an organization's rules, but from workers'
statuses outside and inside the organization. Unofficial
power is not part of the organizational structure ~n that
it exists independently of personnel. Workers wIth
unofficial power had greater access to organizational
information, held more institutional knowledge,
maintained strong informal networks, and enjoyed
greater access to worker-managers or board members.
Through unofficial power, workers could mobilize
organizational responses to their disputes through
informal means.
Unofficial power has both individual and
organizational components. While I am interested in
the culture of power and disputing at the organizational
level I measured this at the individual level because
disp~tes-my focus-are individual phenomena.
However, the organizational level of analysis is not
simply an aggregate of the power of the individual
workers, but is part of the organizational structure and
culture. Since individuals' amounts of power were
affected by the organization's structure and culture, the
individuals' dispute resolution styles came out of that
organizational culture. Thus, I examined power at both
the individual level and the organizational level,
specifically, individual-level power endowments and
organizational power structures. In this way, the actual
dispute strategies, the focus of this project, were caused
by individual-level power, but this relationship cannot
be understood without also studying the organizational
structure.
Power is often conceptualized as a relational
attribute, rather than as a characteristic of organizations
or individuals. Emerson (1962), for example, views
power as relational, in that he understood power "not as
a characteristic of individuals but rather as a property of
a social relation" (Scott 1992, p. 302). He asserts that
power can only be understood in the context of a
relation with another; power is meaningless unless it is
power over another, e.g., A's power over B makes B do
what B otherwise would not. While I agree with this
understanding of power, in this particular study, the
relational aspect of power is less important. This is so
because the relations examined in this project are the
same: I focused on only the relation of workers trying
to mobilize the behavior of the organization to address
their disputes. In other words, power is relational, but I
studied only one relation. Thus, while amounts of
unofficial power varied across individuals and
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organizations, I focused on only one type of
relationship within which power occasionally varied.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The ideological and practical struggles around the
issue of power have made cooperatives ideal sites for
this research. The worker cooperatives in this study
achieved various levels of equality in the day-to-day
workings of their businesses. Some allowed certain
formal hierarchies of official power since their creation,
such as the management stluctures that are mandatory
in the coal industly; others succumbed over time to
allow certain groups to retain greater unofficial power,
such as the subsets of workers at wholefoods
cooperatives who had more unofficial power than their
co-workers. This dissertation does not specifically
address the degree of success or failure that each
worker cooperative achieved, nor does it critique the
level of equality initially intended or eventually
achieved by each cooperative. Rather, I explored how
official and unofficial power affect dispute resolution
strategies with specific focus on gender differences in
grievance behavior. I made comparisons between
cooperatives and conventional businesses and among
industries with various gender compositions to draw
out the intricate relationships between power, structure,
culture, and grievance resolution.
I show that the effect of unofficial power on
grievance resolution may be more substantial than that
of official power, creating unintended workplace
cultures not immediately evident from organizations'
formal regulations and rules. This is true both for
worker cooperatives, where the professed goal was
equality, as well as for conventional businesses with
hierarchies of unequal amounts of workplace power. I
analyzed cooperatives that had deliberately structured
themselves to equalize official power, yet had subsets
of their workforce with far more unofficial power than
other co-workers. For example, all members of the
taxicab worker cooperative were officially equal, but
men at the cooperative possessed greater unofficial
power than women.
This does not mean that unofficial and official
power were always in conflict. I also examined
cooperatives with officially egalitarian ideologies and
flattened structures intended to evenly distribute power,
where members did, in fact, have a high level of
equality, sharing official and unofficial power. For
example, members of the cooperative coal mine had
high levels of both official and unofficial power; they
had extensive official rights and they exercised
unofficial power regularly. Similarly, I included
hierarchical businesses that made no attempt to create
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equal, shared power, and whose employees, indeed,
had little official or unofficial power, such as the
conventionally-organized wholefoods distribution
company.
The first portion of my research demonstrates how
official power and unofficial power affect grievance
behavior. Here, I argue that workers with official
power but little unofficial power were more likely to
use formal grievance procedures to resolve disputes
because they did not have the option of informal
grievance resolution. However, workers with high
levels of both official and unofficial power could
choose from infOlmal or formal routes, but preferred
informal grievance resolution. Workers with little
power--either official or unofficial-often opted to
leave their jobs or learned to tolerate potential
grievances, rather than address workplace disputes
formally or informally.
The second part of my research, however,
complicates this straightforward model. There, I
explore workers at organizations with different power
structures, but similar grievance behaviors. These were
the workers in the homecare businesses. At each
homecare business, the home care workers had a
different amount of power from workers at the other
home care sites, yet all preferred to resolve disputes
informally. I explain this by examining the structure
and culture of the homecare industry. Unlike the
workers in the other three industries-where disputes
generally involved two parties: the worker and the
manager (or another worker)-disputes in homecare
industries involved at least three parties: the worker,
the manager (or another worker), and the client. This
greatly changed the dynamics of grievance resolution,
increasing the difficulty of raising formal grievances.
In fact, very few workers in any of the three homecare
businesses discussed formal grievance strategies.
Therefore, I argue that this triangular nature of disputes
in the homecare industry (i.e., worker-manager-client),
as well as the industry's ethic of care, override the
previously illustrated influence of power on grievance
resolution.

I describe the businesses and industries that I
included in this study in Chapter 3. The industries are
arrayed along a gender continuum from businesses that
employ mostly men in a traditionally male occupation
(i.e., coal mining) to businesses that employ mostly
women in a traditionally female occupation (i.e.,
homecare). I also included taxicab companies, which
represent an indusuy that remains predominantly male,
and wholefoods distribution, which is "gender neutral,"
employing even proportions of men and women.
In Chapter 4, I discuss research methods and some
of the methodological issues involved. The data were
gathered primarily through open-ended interviews and
some nonparticipant observations. The interviews were
analyzed using NVivo qualitative data software, which
allowed me to easily tally responses by interviewees to
illustrate the patterns in their responses.
Chapters 5 and 6 describe and discuss my results. In
contrast to the divisions predicted by the literature, I
did not find the structure and ideology of the
organizations to affect grievance behavior unifonnly
throughout the four industries. While consistent
differences existed between cooperatives and
conventional businesses within the various industries,
these did not establish a pattern across all businesses.
Gender divisions, also, were not found in the grievance
behavior throughout the industries. Instead, I found
that varying degrees of official and unofficial power
affected workers' use of formal and informal grievance
resolution within each indUStry.
In the final chapter, Chapter 7, I provide a summary,
a brief discussion of policy implications, and
suggestions for future research.
Worker cooperatives offer a unique window into the
dynamics of power and dispute resolution. Their
flattened hierarchies, egalitarian ideology, and shared
ownership redistribute power in both predictable and
surprising ways. These unique organizational
characteristics provide interesting sociolegal insights
into worker power and grievance behavior, and allow a
qualitative inquiry into how the structure and culture of
industries and workplaces affect workers' dispute
resolution strategies.

ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION
Many earlier studies by other researchers inform this
thesis, as I mentioned previously. These are discussed
in Chapter 2, in which I draw from the literatures of
Sociology of Law, of Gender, and of Complex
Organizations, as well as the limited research on
worker cooperatives. These literatures predict
substantial differences in grievance strategies between
workers in cooperatives and conventional businesses,
and between male and female workers.
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NOTES
1. Worker cooperatives still have many of the goals of
conventional businesses, such as profits and efficiency.
2. In housing cooperatives, the cooperative (the organization
itself, usually) owns the building and rents the housing to
members (Honigsberg, P.I., B. Kamoroff et al. 1982).
Many housing cooperatives, in addition to payment of
rent, also require services from members, such as
housekeeping, cooking, or yardwork. Consumer
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cooperatives are owned by the consumers who shop at
them, not by their employees. Sometimes called "member
discount co-ops," consumer cooperatives provide goods at
reduced prices to those who have purchased a membership
(Honigsberg, P.I., B. Kamoroff et al. 1982).
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